# DEMOCRATIZATION OF UNO: DEMAND OF PRESENT WORLD SCENARIO

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*Abstract :*

*The evolving landscape of global politics is marked by the rising influence of developing nations, particularly those in the global South, demanding a transformation in the structure and functioning of international organizations, with a particular focus on the United Nations (UN). This article examines the changing dynamics in global governance across four critical domains: health, finance, migration, and security. It underscores the imperative for reforming multilateral institutions to accommodate the growing strategic options and interests of developing nations. These nations have increasingly asserted their voices and agency, advocating for enhanced representation, equitable decision-making procedures, and greater accountability within international organizations.In the realm of health governance, civil society activists and non-governmental organizations have played pivotal roles in reshaping global responses to issues such as debt relief, access to essential medicines, and human rights enforcement. There is an evident need to revamp international institutions to better reflect the diverse interests and concerns of nations worldwide, especially developing ones. The financial global governance arena also faces challenges, with a growing urgency to reform current institutions to address the needs and priorities of emerging economies and safeguard their access to global markets.Migration governance represents another complex area where international cooperation is crucial, and the absence of effective institutions poses significant challenges. Governments have increasingly sought alternative approaches to address migration issues, often bypassing the inefficiencies of existing international bodies. The article further highlights the interplay of North-South divides, regionalism, and the emergence of coalitions among developing nations, which challenge established agendas and governance structures across various domains. The rise of emerging economies, such as China, Brazil, India, and Russia, has prompted a reassessment of global power dynamics, necessitating a reevaluation of international institutions' roles and functions.*

*Keywords: Global Governance, Developing Nations, International Institutions, Financial Global Governance, Security Governance, Health Governance, Migration Governance, Regionalism, Multilateralism*

## INTRODUCTION

Politics throughout the world are changing as a result of the developing nations in the South. It is igniting regionalism and generating fresh calls for global organisations. As a consequence, developing nations now have more strategic options than ever before, and there is a pressing need to revamp and revitalise regional and multilateral organisations. This article delves at the changing landscape of governance in four key areas: health, finance, migration, and security. It then emphasises the consequences for developing nations. Developing nations have strong and well-defined interests in every domain. Global governance likewise has its fair share of problems. In the largely institutionalised field of finance, for example, changing the status quo of current institutions is crucial. When it comes to migration, on the other hand, international talks are required and institutions are nonexistent.

The Human Development Report of 2002 examined the possibility of strengthening democracies worldwide in the aftermath of the terrorist events of September 11th, which occurred more than ten years ago. Pluralism in global politics has been on the rise, according to the report. Civil society activists have been successful in changing the global governance of debt relief, access to essential medicines, and the enforcement of human rights through trade unions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and transnational campaigns. There was a strong need for reform of international organisations, including more representation, more equitable decision-making procedures, and more accountability, as stated in the study.

A new problem has emerged for world governance today. It is now more clear than ever that developing economies, and China in particular, are becoming global power brokers, and that the global South is on the rise. Economic ties between China and its neighbours and other developing nations have become stronger and deeper as a result of this trend. Their worldwide markets and manufacturing have grown at a fast pace. More and more, they will need international regulations to safeguard their access to global markets.

Informal, standard-setting networks of commercial and non-governmental players were all the rage in the '90s and '00s, but formal, multilateral institutions are also viable options for making global regulations. It is probable that developing nations will choose the former. In their internal affairs and foreign policy, Brazil, China, India, and the Russian Federation all prioritise the state. Multilateral institutions have the ability to formalise decision-making and representation while yet respecting the authority and procedures of individual nations' governments.

But old-fashioned international organisations aren't up to the task. Major international bodies have been ignoring the failures of strong states for decades. They just launched new programmes to do what global organisations failed to do because they avoided dealing with outdated

representation, biassed interests, ineffective leadership, and paralysing bureaucracy. This paper cites numerous examples, such as the following:   the rise of informal groups within the UN to avoid a stalled or gridlocked UN Security Council; regional consultative processes on migration and security to compensate for the inability to advance global negotiations; the replacement of global regulation by voluntary standards in finance; the establishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) instead of the World Health Organisation (WHO);   and so on. Each time, governments have looked for ways to circumvent the inefficient workings of international institutions, such as by the formation of informal networks or public-private partnerships, in the hopes of speeding up the process. Their focus should now be on the organisations. Especially in the realm of international finance, the emergence of countries in the global South has brought a fresh sense of urgency to the need to reform international institutions. In response to the worldwide economic downturn, the finance ministers of the status quo powers, the Group of 7 (G7), have reached out to developing nations, including those in the G20, to solicit financial aid and pledge to give them a stronger voice in international bodies that are relevant to their problems. Emerging countries are pursuing national, bilateral, and regional policies because they are not yet convinced that multilaterals would prioritise their interests above those of the US and Europe. They are building up their own foreign currency reserves ('self-insurance'), using bilateral credit lines when they are vulnerable, and strengthening regional arrangements, as we shall see below, rather than depending on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to which they are now making larger contributions.

Due to the importance of international trade regulations, governments have turned to bilateral and regional discussions, such as those in the Asia-Pacific area, after becoming dissatisfied with the Doha round of talks. An example of a new approach to international negotiations is the Group of 6 (G6), which consists of the US, EU, Australia, Brazil, and India.

Climate change discussions are also showing signs of change. Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, adapting to a changing climate, sharing innovative technology, and securing relevant financial resources all need collective effort. Despite the fact that multilateral negotiations have persisted for over twenty years, the global climate regime and negotiating tactics are undergoing significant changes due to a number of recent events. Smaller groupings  like the G20, US-BASIC (the US with Brazil, China, India, and South Africa), and the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) are replacing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  as preferred venues for climate negotiations. The shift from national mitigation efforts focused on top-down objectives to bottom-up approaches is another indicator of change. As nations work out partnerships to collaborate on innovation development or set up carbon markets for particular regions, bilateral and regional agreements take on more

significance. The connections to health, migration, intellectual property, commerce, and finance are increasingly apparent.

North-South divides have historically impacted the four topics covered in this paper: migration, health, security, and finance. The global South perceives the North as having a stranglehold on government. Emerging coalitions are posing threats to established agendas across many domains; for example, southern nations often divide along ideological lines. Alter- native regional and sub-regional systems are also posing challenges to the institutions and procedures in every field of government, either directly or indirectly. In every field, new strategic options are appearing for developing nations.

In Section 1, we take a look at financial global governance, the domain where developing nations have been the most vocal in their criticism of established institutions. It draws attention to how regionalism, aid/development finance politics, and formal governance are all undergoing continuous transformations. The second section evaluates the evolution of international security governance. As a result of changes in power, different groups' priorities and approaches have spread, casting doubt on long-held assumptions about how nations can work together to ensure global security. In Section 3, we provide a map of the global health governance system, outlining the many new projects and players that have emerged in recent years and how networks have grown in importance as a means of leadership and coordination. Given the dramatic increase in the number of migrants, Section 4 investigates how the global governance of migration has evolved. For an overview, refer to the Annex.

Three concepts may serve as frameworks for contemplating change, derived from examinations of these four domains of governance. The three main points are as follows: increased transparency and accountability to a broader range of governments and stakeholders; a focus on multilateral procedures; and pluralism, in which systems of governance at the national, regional, and global levels collaborate.

## THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCE

International financial crises may impact any country, and global agreements that establish standards, combine resources, and coordinate responses can make or break such governments. The techniques that particular governments have access to are either amplified or limited by these. Thailand explored a number of approaches in 1997, when a speculative assault on the baht swiftly enveloped East Asia in a massive financial crisis. Instead of using its own foreign exchange reserves to prop up its currency, it ran out. Even after floating the currency, it was still unable to cope. China and Japan were approached by the prime minister for bilateral aid, but they declined to provide any emergency financing. At long last, the government caved to pressure

from the IMF. Following the failure of its strategy to alleviate the crisis, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were compelled to implement emergency measures.

During the crisis, four aspects of international cooperation were brought to light, which nations might ideally depend on:

- We need insurance against external crises or emergency aid in the case of a financial crisis that spreads;

- a system to regulate banks and resolve sovereign debt crises in a world with many sovereign creditors;

- regulations for exchange rates and a place to discuss alleged violations to stop "currency wars";

- and development funding for nations and industries that don't get enough investment money from the market.

Since WWII, regional and international institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group, have largely coordinated cooperation in global finance. While the United States and the European Union dominate the system, the emergence of influential transnational NGOs poses a challenge, according to the Human Development Report from 2002. These organisations were resolute in their pursuit of accountability against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and they succeeded in elevating issues of transparency, poverty eradication, environmental protection, and human rights to the forefront of international agendas. But they were mostly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from the north, and they were fighting a paradigm that originated in the north.

Since 2002, when they first started to make a dent in global financial regulation, developing nations have formed their own regional support and monetary systems. Developing nations face new challenges and must make strategic decisions due to this fast development. This article examines three topics: the growing influence of developing nations in international financial discourse, the changing nature of humanitarian assistance, and the expansion of regional monetary agreements.

**THE RISE OF EMERGING ECONOMIES IN GLOBAL DISCUSSIONS OF FINANCE**

The worldwide system of financial regulation was shown to be inadequate during the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Realising it needed to consult more extensively, the G7—which had been the informal steering committee of the IMF throughout crises for years—took that decision. To be more precise, developing economies have to have a voice in crisis management. Officials

from the financial sectors of just more than 20 of the world's biggest economies came together to form the G20, an organisation co-founded by the US and Canada. By doing so, they avoided demands for swift and drastic changes to the World Bank's and the IMF's management, but they did plant the seeds for future reforms.

Changes started occurring after 1997, but were sped up by the 2008 financial crisis. A group of countries including Russia, China, India, and Brazil were asked to provide the International Monetary Fund emergency backup lines of credit. Thus, they were granted the power to veto any decisions on the lines.1 After decades of fighting over minor shifts in voting power, developing countries finally achieved significant progress in governance today. There is now a deputy managing director from China at the IMF, and the country is on track to become the third most influential shareholder. China has emerged as a major donor to the International Development Association and has appointed a Chinese top economist to the World Bank. In place of the G7, although by no means eliminating it, the G20 has assumed the role of global emergency committee. It aims to increase involvement in host institutions like the Bank for International Settlements and has established a Financial Stability Board.

Despite initial fears that smaller developing nations would be more marginalised, the changes have not inadvertently left them out. Developing nations have offered assistance to the main rising economies on occasion, and each has claimed to speak for a larger group at different times. However, these economies have not always been together. The concerns stated above have only been partially addressed by these reforms in governance and active collaboration, as seen by the 2008 crisis.

The issue quickly revealed EU-wide vulnerabilities after originating in the US and UK. The first surge happened as the global conveyor belt gained more seats at the decision-making and debating tables.

They are now successful financiers on their own. Additionally, the financial sector caused a "credit crunch" in nations that had allowed international banks to operate within their borders. Chaos ensued in Ukraine, Romania, Iceland, and Hungary. A second wave hit shortly after, this time felt in the "real economy," when countries' economies went into lockdown due to the credit crisis, cutting off international commerce and triggering a worldwide recession. The term "development emergency" was used in a study tracking the crisis's effect on the world's poorest nations by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 2009.

We took immediate action. In response, major economies worked together to do things like cut benchmark interest rates at their central banks and institute huge bank rescue programmes in the US and UK. A number of goals were agreed upon by the G20 leaders in November 2008:

reviving domestic economies without harming international commerce; regulating international finance; aiding the world's poorest nations; and reforming international institutions. The announcement that they will be providing the IMF with $1 trillion was made in April 2009.

The need for collaboration that accomplishes the aforementioned four goals is highlighted by the crises of 2008 and the Eurozone crisis that followed. However, developing and growing nations have tended to depend on themselves more and more, while industrialised nations have looked to international organisations.

## THE NEW POLITICS OF AID

In the realm of assistance and development money, 2005 was a watershed year. Most members of the Group of Eight (G8) fell short of their 2005 vow to increase development aid to Africa.2 China's covert expansion of commercial, assistance, and investment ties with Africa became apparent to observers. Brazil, China, India, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Venezuela were projected to increase their official development assistance to little more than $1 billion by 2010, according to conservative 2007 forecasts (IMF and World Bank 2006, Reisen 2007).

There was significant dissatisfaction with the traditional "aid system" and donors of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), which paved the way for rising economies and poor nations to connect more closely. Donors were forcing their own dynamic priorities and conditions on recipient nations rather than delivering pledged help, listening to their needs, and responding appropriately. They resorted to demanding that impoverished nations use cumbersome, redundant, bureaucratic, and resource-squandering processes for assistance transactions and reporting rather than using simple, practical methods themselves.

Contrarily, developing nations' governments have been vocal about their desire to lend and receive help without conditions, emphasising their respect for other nations' sovereignty. Sovereignty, equality, and mutual respect are among the eight tenets that China uses to guide its assistance. The tenets of India's assistance programme, which dates back to the 1950s, are as follows: non-aggression, equality, mutual benefit, peaceful cohabitation, non-interference in internal matters, and respect for territorial integrity (Price 2005). In the wake of their own economic success, emerging donors have ramped up their help, which they have woven into trade and investment plans to foster economic development while fostering a certain level of self-sufficiency.

'Established' donors persist in establishing and maintaining several independent assistance organisations and procedures, despite calls for more aid coordination. This creates a symphony

of competing demands on governments that are already struggling to meet their own needs. Every day, developing nations hear from the federal, state, and local governments of the US, UK, and Canada through a plethora of platforms, including bilateral and multilateral organisations such as the UNDP, World Bank, IMF, WHO, WTO, and so on. Worse still, even when donors do make use of multilateral organisations, they burden them with unique requirements, extra funding, and red tape. Trust funds are becoming more common, for instance. "We construct an elaborate mechanism for setting priorities and discipline in the Bank, and then as donors we bypass this mechanism by setting up separate financial incentives to try to get the Bank to do what we want," says a former UK government aid official describing this practice at the World Bank (Masood 2006, p. 90).

There has been little effort by emerging economies to participate in or challenge the established norms of multilateral development aid. But they have undermined the negotiating position of Western donors and generated competitive pressures by providing alternatives to certain aid-receiving countries.

**THE NEW REGIONALISM IN MONETARY COOPERATION**

To safeguard their financial autonomy in the case of unfavourable events, developing countries started to accumulate foreign currency reserves after the East Asian crisis. They looked for other forms of insurance since the International Monetary Fund's pooled support was stigmatised and thought to pay out only under stringent conditions. One option is individual reserves, although most areas' governments have tried to strengthen this via regional agreements.

An Asian initiative known as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) developed out of a web of trade deals. Consequently, a $120 billion multilateral fund has been established by the ten ASEAN nations as well as by China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. In times of short-term liquidity and balance-of-payment crises, members may rely on it. They are required to have an IMF programme in place if they use more than 20% of their allocated disbursements.

By now, the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) has amassed around $2.7 billion throughout the Middle East.3 That year, 1976, it launched. In addition to providing emergency funding, the 22 member nations work together on a larger monetary level with the goal of creating a single Arab currency. Additionally, having an IMF programme is a requirement for its borrowing members.

Approximately $2.34 billion is now in the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR). Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela are members of this organisation that was established in 1978. Support for members' balance of payments is a feature it shares with other regional funds. Reserve investments and regional monetary policy coordination are both made

easier, and loans to third parties are also guaranteed. Borrowing members of the FLAR are not required to have an IMF programme, unlike the CMI and the AMF.During the financial crisis of 2008, self-insurance and regional arrangements were put to the test. As the world's sixth-largest holder of reserves, the Republic of Korea has accumulated more than $200 billion. However, it quickly discovered that tapping into its plentiful reserves undermined investor confidence. The situation required a more collaborative approach. Given the residual animosity against the 1997 IMF plan and the CMI, it refrained from seeking assistance from the IMF. The US Federal Reserve's $30 billion swap line and bilateral swap arrangements with Japan and China were instead used.There are three takeaways for developing and emerging economies from the 2008 crisis, including its effects on international organisations, the humanitarian system, and emergency funding:

• For starters, a resilient country is an important one. Countries should strengthen their national resources and resilience via prudential measures, reserves, banking regulation, and management of public finances, regardless of regional or global governance structures. This serves as their first defence.

• Secondly, international agreements must not be disregarded. Global agreements, resources, and delivery systems will have an impact on developing nations; hence, they need to figure out how to influence these factors.

• The poor world now has more options than ever before thanks to regional agreements and an increasing pool of prospective contributors. Both their resistance and their ability to gain ground may be enhanced in this way.

There are three ways this affects international leadership:

• The first tenet is that the various approaches that nations are taking must be accommodated by global governance mechanisms. Diversifying a country's exposure and insurance plans is a smart financial move. The international monetary fund (IMF), regional agreements, bilateral credit lines, and national reserves will all be on their radar. A pluralist international order is necessary.

• In addition, multilateral institutions must be altered if developing nations are to benefit from reduced costs, more assistance, and better access to information via international collaboration and regulations. The only way for the global South to increase its usage of multilaterals is for these organisations to be seen as looking out for their interests just as much as the interests of the US and Europe.

• Finally, at every turn, the worldwide organisations' capacity to answer to their whole membership and beyond will be examined closely. This is due in part to the fact that a larger number of governments consider themselves to be stakeholders. Similarly, a significantly

broader spectrum of actors may now be easily scrutinised thanks to the information revolution.

## THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY

Conflicts characterised by 1,000 or more casualties in combat each year have shown a marked decrease in high-intensity political violence during the Cold War era (Human Security Report Project 2010). Although this might be seen as a step towards better global security, the poorest nations bear a disproportionate share of the burden from ongoing hostilities. The annual cost of civil conflicts is projected to be $64 billion, according to Collier (2008). It is common for impoverished nations to be unable to escape the cycle of poverty that follows a war. Relapse is more likely if they are unable to do so. The erosion of progress is accelerated in areas where conflicts recur.

International security and development agendas now prioritise the stabilisation of governments that are seen as unstable. The international community has intervened in fragile nations, particularly in Africa, via official and informal institutions, multilateral and unilateral channels, and out of concern for human development and the possibility of security spillovers. But the UN security system and broader development aid have seen their authority eroded by ineffective results and the rising influence of developing nations like Venezuela, South Africa,  China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil. At the regional level, adjacent nations, which are often already vulnerable, bear the brunt of a failed state. A lack of resources, worries over sovereignty, and conflicts or tensions between  nations typically impede such action, yet this creates strong incentives for collaboration within impacted areas.

There is a lot of unpredictability and change in the world of global security right now. Controversy surrounds the post-Cold War era's trends and understandings. There is a lot of overlap and competition between regional and global security systems because of this. In the 1990s, Western concepts like "cooperative security" and "comprehensive security" were dominant.4 In the early 2000s, the United States maintained its hegemonic position. There have been ramifications for global governance stemming from the fact that the change in global power has caused a spread of principles, preferences, ideas, and values in addition to power (Hurrell 2012). International cooperation is being criticised by developing nations for being too focused on the West. Conversely, Western nations often accuse international cooperation of ignoring rising countries, using claims such "Iran is a rogue state,""India is being obstructionist," and "China is failing to be part of the solution."7

Changes in global security are driven by three main variables. The number and complexity of disputes handled by global bodies is the primary concern. Human security, the responsibility to protect, and the security-development nexus are all examples of the second trend, which is the

international community's elevated functional and normative aspirations. Finally, despite mounting pressure on regional and global stakeholders to face the new reality, international organisations have struggled to officially respond to changes in global power. According to Keohane (2006), multilateralism after 1945 served to enhance rather than replace interstate connections. Additionally, multilateralism lacked true multilateralism. It ignored the growing South in favour of the industrialised North and the United States. The goals and extent of it were limited.

There has been no worldwide institutional change, despite the fact that there is a great need for mechanisms to manage regional and global security due to the changing nature of the security scene. One example is the overhaul of the UN Security Council. According to Article 24 of the UN Charter, the Council has the major duty (but not the only one) for maintaining international peace and security. This is despite the fact that the Council is not always at the top of global security governance. There has been widespread agreement that the Council needs significant change since the early 1990s. Yet, regional and international players from the North and the South of the globe remain divided on this issue. In spite of summit pronouncements, the BRICS countries—South Africa, China, India, and the Russian Federation—have not reached a consensus on the matter.8 Chinese and Russian officials "reiterate[d] the importance they attach to the status of India, Brazil, and South Africa in inter-national affairs, and understand and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN,"9 during the 2011 BRICS Summit in Sanya. However, this statement does not reflect actual policy goals. The informal G4 coalition, which includes Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, made another attempt to grow the Council at the start of this year. China and the so-called 'United for Consensus' group, which is led by Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Italy, and Pakistan, were quick to criticise this move.

In stark contrast to the increase in peace operations, there is a perceived crisis in UN-centered governance. There were fifteen peace operations with a combined budget of $7.8 billion and over 118,000 troops and civilians participating as of February 2012 (United Nations 2012). The Security Council may not be "the imaginary invalid" after all, but it could certainly need some work in terms of decision-making, efficiency, and representation. But what would it entail in reality if the composition of the Security Council were changed to reflect changes in global power? In an effort to increase the Council's legitimacy and representation, most reform proposals focus too narrowly on increasing the number of Council members. Two issues, however, arise with this method.

To start, there has to be a happy medium between representation and efficiency in the Security Council changes. A bigger Council doesn't always mean it's better. Second, before any comprehensive reform of the Security Council can be considered, the political differences among influential present and prospective members must be resolved. Difficulties in agreeing on

fundamental principles and standards of collective action in global security are shown by the recent vetoes by the Russian Federation and China over Myanmar (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), and Syria (2011 and 2012). In order to cooperatively and responsively handle security relations in the 21st century, the essential challenge is how to politically involve major parties outside and within the Security Council, including Brazil, China, India, the Russian Federation, and South Africa. Efforts to alter the formal frameworks of international organisations will be fruitless in the absence of substantial political participation and a fresh agreement among relevant parties. It is imperative that we prioritise engaging in facilitative multilateralism.

The rise of informal organisations such as G-X groups, contact groups, and core groups of friends has fundamentally altered the way the United Nations handles crises (Prantl 2006). Between multilateral governance and conventional diplomacy involving big powers, such organisations have grown to serve an essential role in a variety of contexts. There was an increase from four to over thirty such mechanisms in UN conflict resolution between 1990 and 2006. There was a corresponding uptick in efforts by the UN and others to manage conflicts, avoid them, and establish peace in the aftermath of such events.

To circumvent the Security Council's inherent flaws and provide a platform to nations underrepresented there, informal structures have emerged. As a result, such processes could reduce the need for formal adaptation. Still, they won't magically fix the "bads" of security governance that the public faces. The most these systems can do is add to the current system of global governance by providing an other path for the applicant, which weakens the already precarious position of international organisations. To be effective, informal institutions must manage the delicate balancing act between the opposing goals of legitimacy, representation, accountability, and effectiveness. Constructing international pluralism that works is the real difficulty.

The five permanent UN Security Council members now play a far different function than they did in the past. Although there is still a lot of coordination between them, the importance of bilateral discussions between China and the US has grown significantly. Simultaneously, the BRICS have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to harmonise their stances on critical issues pertaining to the Security Council.

On both a global and regional scale, challenges to the established security order are active. On a global or United Nations scale, this is most obviously seen in discussions over how to put the duty to protect framework into action. It spells forth the duties of nations towards their own citizens as well as those of the global community in dealing with atrocities committed beyond national boundaries, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the framework during the 2005 World

Summit, but there is still a great deal of political disagreement on how to put it into practice. Russia, Brazil, China, and India were all vehemently against the plan from the start, or at least quite ambivalent. According to Pantall and Nakano (2011), China deliberately sought to narrow the scope of the idea during the adoption discussions. There were no detailed intervention requirements included in the summit statement. It maintained the Security Council's principal role in authorising intervention, with the ability for China or Russia to veto any undesirable move.

Although Security Council Resolution 1973, which explicitly references the duty to protect, authorised NATO operation Unified Protector in Libya in March 2011—this case is very unlikely to be used as a template for other operations. Abstentionist nations Russia, Brazil, China, and India voiced grave concerns about the resolution's too wide interpretation. They were vehemently against seeking a regime change in Libya and aiding rebels there. In light of what happened in Libya, it is important to understand why Russia and China vetoed a plan for joint action in Syria in February 2012 and October 2011, respectively.10

New forms of security governance have emerged as a focal point of contention on a regional scale. An excellent illustration of this is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (Prantl 2013). China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are the founding members of this organisation, which has been going strong since 2001. China has been an active participant in this organisation from its inception, making it unique among international organisations. The so-called Shanghai spirit (Shanghai jingshen) is the guiding principle of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This includes, as stated by Yang Jiechi, "a multipolar world" and "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diversified civilizations and pursuit of common development."13 As a result, the SCO is useful both internally and externally: In one sense, it acts as a platform for collaboration among a varied set of autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes; in another, it offers a counter-model to the perceived danger of a Western liberal order headed by the United regimes and governs ties among its members. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) provides a global platform where Russia and China may express and justify their shared goals.14

In its language on missile defence,  the Astana Declaration on the SCO's 10th anniversary effectively borrowed from Russia's position, stressing that "unilateral and unlimited build-up of anti-missile defence by a particular country or a narrow group of coun-tries could damage strategic stability and international security."15 In addition, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy faces a serious obstacle in the form of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, which was adopted in 2001. It is a requirement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) accords that member nations pursue violently or nonviolently radicals and separatists as the SCO defines

them. The SCO offers a framework for self-legitimation by establishing the rules and principles of counter-terrorism measures inside the Central Asian regional context, even when such activities contradict international laws against refoulement.

In light of the above, developing nations might take one of three primary approaches to shaping international security policy:

- As a whole, we may draw three principles for forming a united front on global security governance.

- Pluralism must be prioritised. When it comes to security governance, there is no silver bullet. International collaboration is great, but regional and subregional cooperation are even better.

- Second, it is critical to have a multilateral mechanism that is enhanced. When it comes to matters of national and international security, great countries must act. A precondition is an agreement on "the rules of the game" reached via political means by important parties. In order to ensure that members of international organisations adhere to certain standards of behaviour, these regulations serve as a basis for their operations.

- The third point is that the world's security governments need to be held more accountable. The need of holding individuals in positions of power and military authority to account cannot be overstated, given the dynamic and contentious character of global security governance.

## CONCLUSIONS

The demands for democratization of the United Nations and other global institutions are underscored by the shifting dynamics of global governance. Developing nations, particularly those in the global South, are increasingly asserting their interests and influence across critical domains of international cooperation. The imperative for reforming international institutions is evident, with a focus on enhancing representation, transparency, and accountability. The financial global governance landscape requires a more inclusive approach to accommodate the growing role of emerging economies. Similarly, the security governance arena necessitates adaptation to new power dynamics, with a need to balance efficacy and representativeness in decision-making. Health governance and migration governance also call for more robust and responsive international mechanisms to address global challenges effectively. The rise of informal networks and regional initiatives signals a transformation in the way international cooperation is conducted, reflecting the changing dynamics of global politics. Multilateral institutions must evolve to better serve the interests of developing nations, promote collaboration, and ensure a more equitable distribution of power and resources. As the world

continues to evolve, the democratization of international organizations is not only a demand of the present world scenario but a critical step toward fostering a more just and inclusive global order, where the voices of all nations, large and small, are heard and respected in shaping the future of our interconnected world.

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